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Perspectives on the European Monetary
Union: Lessons for the Economic
Community of West African States
(ECOWAS)
∗

J. E. L Sagbamah

The attainment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) under the auspices of the European Union
(EU) was a product of effective planning and sequencing of programmes. The establishment of
political institutions such as the European Council, Assembly, Court of Justice and, particularly, the
European Commission provided the general framework and direction for the achievement of the EMU.
In addition, specialized institutions such as the Sectoral Commissions, European Monetary Institute
(which was later transformed into the European Central Bank) and the European System of Central
Banks provided technical support for driving the EMU project.

These institutions nurtured and

fostered the political, social, market, financial, infrastructural, production, economic and monetary
sectors of integration. The EU experience had significant integration implications for currency, money
market, capital market, foreign exchange market, reserves management and economic policy. It also
had implications for the non-EMU members referred to as the derogation countries. The overall EU
experience has profound and important lessons for the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) in its drive to provide the needed political will, social enlightenment campaign and
mobilization for the acceptance of integration, as well as the provision of standardized products and
financial markets. It also reveals the levels of basic infrastructure, production and overall economic
structure that are needed to be in place, before transiting into a monetary union.
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I.

Introduction

F
of

or about 30 years of its existence, the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) has been saddled with the task of integrating the
economies of member countries.

The initial programme envisioned for

ECOWAS integration was to achieve a common market, a much higher level

integration

than

a

free

trade

area

or

a

customs

union.
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However, the ultimate ambition of the founding fathers was to transit further from a
common market to an economic and monetary union, the highest level of integration.
At the level of a common market, ECOWAS members were expected to dismantle
tariffs, ensure free movement of goods and services, free mobility of labour and
capital. These would foster the exchange of ideas, improve financial intermediation,
promote technological advancement, ensure efficient resources allocation and
engender higher level of production of goods and services for a larger market that will
emerge in the sub-region. Such an enlarged market will provide the benefits of
comparative advantage and economies of scale. These were the ideals and other basic
architecture which the European Union (EU) provided before implementing the
monetary union.
In the case of the ECOWAS, the progress made since its establishment through the
Treaty of Lagos on May 28, 1975, has been unimpressive. For instance, the ECOWAS
trade liberalization scheme intended to free trade, facilitate human and capital
mobility has met with limited success. Tariffs have not been dismantled by members
who have continued to administer different customs declarations and valuation
methods. As such, few countries that have complied with the tariffs and customs
harmonization are losing revenue. In deed, those losing revenue are not being
compensated to encourage them in implementing the scheme further. Numerous
check points exist on roads and ports where taxes of various descriptions are extorted
from commuters. Also, the lack of transportation and telecommunications networks,
linking member states, have not only impeded trade but also increased the cost of
doing business.

Furthermore, the non-harmonization of trade and investment

policies in the sub-region has discouraged investors in establishing businesses in
member states. Some member countries still pay allegiances to their colonial masters
and thus, maintaining strong trade links with Europe rather than with regional
members.

Consequently, intra-regional trade has been limited in scope.

The

inefficiency of the existing clearing system, the lack of political will on the part of
ECOWAS member states and the existence of other sub-regional monetary unions
within the ECOWAS, have all contributed to the poor performance recorded thus far.
In the light of the above constraints to the integration process in the West African
sub-region, this study provides a comprehensive review of developments in the EU
and more importantly, the various landmarks on the roadmap for achieving the
European Monetary Union (EMU). It also provides a comparative analysis from
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which to draw lessons of experience to guide and also to inspire ECOWAS member
states to attain a monetary union in the sub-region.
To achieve the objectives of this study, the paper is organized into seven parts, with
this introduction as Part I. It is followed by Part 2 which provides a theoretical
framework for regional integration, while Part 3 traces and highlights the evolution
and institutional developments of the EU. Part 4 discusses in details the major
programmes, projects and polices which led to the attainment of the EMU; Part 5
undertakes a comprehensive review of ECOWAS integration efforts, thus highlighting
the historical evolution, institutional development and drawing a comparative
analysis of EU’s lessons of experience for the ECOWAS and also indicating the
sequencing of integration.

Part 6 highlights policy recommendations for the

ECOWAS sub-region, while Part 7 summarizes and concludes the study.

II.

Theoretical Framework for Regional Integration

The term “regional integration” is an aspect of international economics, but its usage
according to El-Agraa (1999), quoting Machlup (1977), was relatively unknown until
1942.

Schiff and Winters (2003) however note that the practice of regional

integration has been in existence for hundreds of years. For instance, in 1664, France
proposed a customs union, while Austria signed free trade agreements with five
neigbouring countries in the 18th and 19th centuries. Indeed, the authors asserted that
preferential trade agreements were the basis for colonial empires, while customs
union arrangements led to the creation of the states of Germany, Italy and the United
States.
By the 1950s, the term became widely used and defined by economists as “a state of
affairs or process which involves the amalgamation of separate economies into larger
free trading regions” (El-Agraa, 1999). More specifically, El-Agraa defines regional
integration as the “discriminatory removal of all trade impediments between at least
two participating nations and with the establishment of certain elements of
cooperation and coordination between them”.
II.1 Reasons for Regional Integration
Countries forming regional integration agreements are usually persuaded by a
number of reasons which can be broadly classified under political and economic
reasons.
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II.1.1 Political Reasons for Regional Integration
The amalgamation of countries to form a monolithic entity through a regional
integration agreement creates a formidable political group governed by regional laws,
rules and regulations. As a group with a large territorial boundary, market, economic
opportunities and pooling of sovereignty, it commands respect between and among
other nations. It could use its bloc power for negotiations and achieve better bargains
than if such negotiations are undertaken by individual countries. Therefore, small
countries under the regional bloc stand to benefit. This was one of the major
considerations when the idea of the EU was conceived by the founding fathers.
Indeed, the political unity of Europe was very paramount in the EU architecture in
order to foster peace and security, strengthen their ideological perspective and also
compare favourably with other large nations such as the United States of America.
Furthermore, under a cover of regional integration block, smaller countries are
strengthened against any external threat or aggression. Also, following the
application of common regional rules and regulations, these countries adopt
democratic best practices in governance which facilitate and sustain internal peace
and security. The benefits of these political factors are given higher weights when
some countries enter into regional integration agreements.
II.1.2. Economic Reasons for Regional Integration
For other countries, the raison d’etre for entering into a regional integration
agreement is largely economic. As a group, the region provides a large market with
lots of potentials for member states than the small markets of individual countries.
Apart from the large market size with inherent potentials, the security of market and
access following the removal of trade barriers for member states are relative
advantages they have over other countries in the rest of the world. The market size
will encourage increased production, competition, enhance efficiency and thus
promote trade – these, according to Schiff and Winters, are the explicit objectives in
the treaties establishing some regional integration agreements. As countries increase
production to meet market demands or requirements, this promotes economies of
scale which leads to lowering of prices and cost of production. Other economic
benefits that could arise following market competition are application of
technological advances and promotion of factor mobility. The combined effects are
the production of cheaper products for member states which enhance intra-regional
trade and also secure improved terms of trade with third countries. Furthermore, as
competition improves to take advantage of market potentials, coupled with regional
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common policies and complemented by domestic policies to provide an enabling
investment-friendly environment that attracts foreign investment and technology,
particularly foreign direct investment (FDI), these will boost the productive capacity
of countries in the region.
Under the cover of a regional group, this provides member countries the opportunity
to act in concert to undertake domestic economic reforms and implement sound
policies to achieve better economic management. Overall, countries will benefit from
high economic growth and development, increased employment opportunities, high
incomes and better standard of living for their citizens.
El-Agraa (1999), however, warns that there is no guarantee that these economic gains
could be achieved; much will depend on the choice of regional integration and the
competitive behaviour existing prior to regional integration; otherwise, regional
integration could worsen the situation.
II.2 Types of Regional Integration
Regional integration agreements vary in type, structure and scope. These include free
trade area, customs union, common market, economic union and monetary union.
Each of these, in terms of structure and scope, is an improvement and of a higher
level than the other.
II.2.1 Free Trade Area
In Free Trade Areas (FTAs), member states agree to abolish internal tariffs and other
quantitative restrictions within the group. However, each participating state is
allowed to maintain its tariff against third countries. Essentially, the sole objective of
FTAs is to promote trade. Examples of FTAs are the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA), the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern Africa, the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), etc.
II.2.2. Customs Union
Customs Unions (CUs) share similar characteristics as FTAs, these involve the
removal of internal tariffs and other discriminatory measures against trade; but in
addition, member states erect common external tariff (CET) against the rest of the
world. The dissimilarity between FTAs and CUs are the application of CET and rules
of origin if a member in FTA indulges in trade deflection. Trade deflection takes place
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when a member in FTA with the least external tariff imports goods from a third
country and re-exports them to member states. Customs unions, therefore, guarantee
free trade for members and also erect protective barriers through CETs. The CETs
give rise to the incidence of trade creation and trade diversion. Trade deflection
differs significantly from trade creation (TC) which is the import of cheaper products
from a partner country than expensive ones from a third country. The inverse of TC is
trade diversion (TD) which represents the import of expensive products from a
partner country than cheaper ones initially imported from a third country. Examples
of CUs are the Mano River Union (MRU), the Southern African Customs Union
(SACU), Arab Common Market, Caribbean Community and Common Market
(CARICOM), etc.
II.2.3 Common Market
In addition to the complete removal of internal tariffs and erection of CETs, common
markets (CMs) include factor mobility of labour (persons), capital, investment,
technology, industry, etc, and the introduction of common rules to ensure fair
competition and standards. Thus, CMs are higher levels of regional integration than
FTAs and CUs. Examples are European Union (EU), Arab Magreb Union (AMU), etc.
II.2.4. Economic Union
Economic Unions (EUs) add to the features of CMs, the harmonization of social and
economic policies. In other words, economic policy harmonization involves the
setting of targets on fiscal, monetary, exchange rate policies for member states. In
effect, member states apply the same policies across. EUs are much higher level of
regional integration than FTAs, CUs and CMs. Before the introduction of the euro on
January 1, 1999, the EMU was indeed an economic union. Also, the West African
Monetary Zone (WAMZ) and ECOWAS are still implementing FTA, CU, CM and EU
in pari passu.
II.2.5. Monetary Union
Monetary Unions (MUs) possess all the characteristics of EUs but the distinguishing
feature are the phasing away of all members’ national currencies, adoption of a single
currency (which El-Algraa (1999) referred to as exchange rate union) and the
establishment of a common central bank to conduct a common monetary policy.
Examples of monetary integration or union are the West African Economic and
Monetary Union or Union Economique El Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) and
the most prominent and influential among all regional integration is the European
Monetary Union (EMU).
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III.

The Historical Evolution and Institutional Development of
the European Union

III.1

Historical Evolution of the European Union and European
Monetary Union

The journey to the formation of the EMU commenced in 1951, when the governments
of six European nations, namely Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands signed the Treaty of Paris for the establishment of the European Coal
and Steel Community. By 1957, the same countries signed the Treaty of Rome which
founded the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC which was later renamed the European Union (EU), however, commenced effectively in 1958. The
objectives of the EEC included the integration of European economies into a common
market to promote higher economic growth and development, ensure regional
stability, increase the standard of living of its people and develop closer relations
among member states. To actualize these lofty objectives of the EEC, four major
institutions were established, these are the Assembly, Council, Commission and
Court of Justice. Of these institutions, the Commission and the Council had and still
have the responsibility for the development of economic and political ideals of the
EEC.

The Commission makes all proposals for the ratification of the Council

(Adedeji, 1990 and Dolan 1990).
Among the early proposals, was the removal of tariff barriers to pave way for the
transition to a common market. Though tariffs were removed in the 1960s, the 1970s
and early 1980s, not much progress was made to achieve the goal of a common
market. Indeed, other than some relative growth in intra-European trade, European
markets were still subdivided along national configurations.

In spite of these

problems which militated against the smooth transition to a common market, the
political ambition of the founding fathers of the EEC was to transform Europe into a
gigantic economic power, a United State of Europe (USE), an equivalent of the
United States of America (USA). The move for the realization of this dream was
imitated in 1970. Popularly known as the Werner’s Plan, named after the then Prime
Minister of Luxembourg, the plan was conceptualized and designed for Europe to
attain a monetary union in that decade. The plan included the establishment of an
European Community Central Bank which would foster and nurture a European
monetary Union. On the basis of this plan, the European Commission on October 30,
1970, submitted a memorandum which proposed the establishment of an European
Economic and Monetary Union. Though, a monetary union could not be realized in

44

Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and Financial Review

March 2006

that decade, it led to the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) in
March 1979.

The EMS comprised three major parts, namely an Exchange Rate

Mechanism (ERM), European Currency Unit (ECU) and European Monetary
Cooperation Fund (EMCF). They were established to ensure monetary stability and
close monetary cooperation amongst member countries. Furthermore, in 1986, the
introduction of the Single European Act, which specified the removal of physical,
technical and fiscal barriers to ensure complete realization of a common market,
brightened the prospects of EMU, and by 1990, the Schengen Agreement eliminated
border checks.
In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty set the conditions necessary for the formation of an
economic union, a major foundation preceding the introduction of EMU. It was in
this same year, specifically February 7, 1992, that the EEC adopted the name
European Union.

The treaty specified criteria which member countries should

achieve in order to participate in the EMU. These criteria referred to as the
convergence criteria, included low inflation, long-term interest rate, budget deficit to
gross domestic product (GDP) ratio, national debt to GDP ratio and adherence to the
existing ERM arrangement. The reference ratios for inflation and long-term interest
rates, budget deficit and national debt to GDP set for 1996 were 2.3, 9.1, 3.0 and 60.0
per cent, respectively. The performances of member countries in 1997 were used to
set the figures for interest and inflation rates in 1998; and by May 1998, on the basis
of each country’s performance, the European Council decided which of the countries
qualified to join EMU on January 1, 1999. At the level of the EMU, participating
countries lost their national powers over some economic policies, especially monetary
policies, for adopting a single currency.

These powers were transferred to a

supranational body (the European Central Bank (ECB)) to formulate and coordinate
such policies for the entire region. Consequently, the European Monetary Institute
(EMI) which was established on January 1, 1994, to serve as the forerunner
transformed into the ECB with the responsibility of conducting monetary policy.
Of the 15 member countries of the EU in 1998, 11 of them (Germany, France,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Ireland, Austria, Portugal and
Finland) were adjudged by the European Council to have met the convergence
criteria set for the formation of the EMU. Britain has since opted out of the EMU
project owing to the arrangement to adopt a single currency other than the Pound
Sterling. The other three countries that could not meet the criteria for joining the
EMU were Denmark, Sweden and Greece. Greece subsequently qualified. The EMI
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which was transformed into the ECB in 1998, made all the necessary preparations for
the historic launching of the single currency called the Euro on January 1, 1999, to
signal the commencement of EMU. On this day, the German mark, French franc,
Italian lira, Austrian shilling, Belgium franc, Luxembourg franc, Dutch guilder,
Spanish peseta, Portuguese escudo, Irish punt and Finish markka were determined at
1.95, 6.56, 193, 6.27, 13.76, 40.34, 2.20, 166.39, 200.48, 0.79 and 5.95 to one euro,
respectively. However, the euro did not go into physical circulation until the year
2002. It was only used for non-cash transactions, such as payments by cheques,
credit cards and bank transfers. In 2002, eight euro coins and seven euro notes were
introduced and circulated side-by-side with the national currencies (Guardian,
2002). The transition period was from January to June, 2002, after which, all
national currencies were withdrawn from circulation. In effect, on July 1, 2002, the
euro became the only legal tender among the participating countries.
Ten new countries were admitted into the EU in May, 2004, thus raising the total
membership to 25. These countries, comprising Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia are, however, not
in the euro zone area, bringing to 14 the total number of countries outside the euro
area. On January 1, 2005, Greece was admitted to join the EMU; consequently the
non-EMU members outside the euro zone have reduced to 13.

III.2 Institutional Development of the European Union and European
Monetary Union
The EU march towards the realization of the EMU, progressed successfully through
the establishment of necessary institutions which served as the pivots for rapid
integration. These institutions designed, formulated and provided logistic support for
the implementation of policies, programmes and projects.
III.2.2 Political Institutions
These are the Council, Assembly, Court of Justice and Commission.
The Council: The executive arm comprising Presidents/Heads of State and
Government that make decisions for the smooth operations of the EU and EMU.
The Assembly: The legislative arm that enact laws for governing the region
The Court of Justice: The judicial arm that interprets laws and adjudicates
between and among participating states.
The Commission: This is the think-tank for major policies, programmes and
projects proposals and implementation.
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III. .2.3. Specialized institutions
These include Sectoral Commissions, European Monetary Institute (EMI), European
Central Bank (ECB) and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).
Sectoral Commissions

Under the Commission, there are nineteen (19) sectoral commissions headed by
commissioners (Financial Times, July 10, 2000) who oversee the development of the
following sectors: (a) Commission Reform; (b) Parliament/Energy/Transport; (c)
Competition; (d) Agriculture; (e) Information/Society; (f) Internal Markets; (g)
Research; (h) Monetary Affairs; (i) Development; (j)

Enlargement; (k) External

Affairs; (l) Trade; (m) Consumer/Food Safety; (n) Regions; (o) Budget; (p)
Environment;

(q)

Justice/Home

Affairs;

(r)

Employment/Social;

and

(s)

Education/Culture
The European Monetary Institute (EMI)

The EMI was established on January 1, 1994. It was based in Frankfurt, Germany. It
served as the forerunner to the emergence of the ECB and the formation of the ESCB.
The EMI was therefore charged with the responsibilities of developing a set of
monetary instruments for the ESCB, the setting-up of a statistical databank and the
preparation of euro bank notes. Also, the EMI served as the coordinating central
bank among national central banks until it was succeeded by the ECB in May 1998.
The European Central Bank (ECB)

As discussed above, the EMI was in May 1998, transformed into the ECB.
Statutorily, the ECB’s main function is to design, formulate and implement
European-wide monetary policy, using policy instruments, particularly the money
market interest rate. The ECB is an independent central bank. The Maastricht
Treaty forbids it to be accountable to any European government or politicians. It is
designed specifically to target inflation and ensure price stability.
The European System of Central Banks (ESCB)

The ESCB is made up of members of the ECB and the central banks of EMU member
states. The ESCB functions, among others, include issues on the operational aspects
of central banking, such as the regular money market operations, funds transfer,
management of international reserves of member states, issuance of euro bank-notes,
lender-of-last resort and prudential supervision, etc. The ESCB members guide these
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roles, particularly, the right to conduct money market operations in order to
safeguard their respective local financial markets.
Other Specialized Agencies

These include the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) which

provides

financial and technical assistance to its overseas dependencies such as the Yaoundé
and Lome Conventions; the European Investment Bank (EIB) provides funds for the
development of projects in the backward areas of the union; European Social Fund
(ESF) financial support to workers displaced in the integration process; member
states financed the development of infrastructures such as roads, rails, air and water
transportation as well as telecommunications to link Europe; European research and
development (R&D) activities led to the successful development of ESPRIT
(aeronautics), RACE (satellite), BRITE (computer), ARAINE (satellite), EUROPE
AIRBUS, European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) (Adedeji, 1990).

IV.

Major Programmes, Projects, Policies and the Implications
for the Achievement of the European Monetary Union

Under this section, major programmes, projects, policies and their implications
which contributed significantly to the achievement of the EMU would be discussed
and analyzed in details.
IV.1. European Monetary System (EMS)
It was not until March, 1979, that the drive towards a monetary union was firmly
initiated through the introduction of the EMS. The EMS was the first practical step
towards ensuring some degree of monetary cooperation and stability among member
states.

The EMS was structured into three major units, namely, the European

Currency Unit (ECU); the European Exchange Rate Mechanism I (ERM I); and the
European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) (Bundus, 1990).
The ECU was an artificial currency that linked member states’ currencies and played
very important role in exchange rate management, and also ensured monetary
stability. Each member state had defined units of its currency in relation to the ECU.
Thus, the ECU served as a common denominator for the conversion of members’
currencies to settle transactions. The ERM I on the other hand provided the
mechanism for ensuring exchange rate stability among currencies of member
countries to guide against currency volatility. In this regard, the specified band which
defined the margins of fluctuation was a plus or minus 2.25 per cent; though Italy
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opted for a wider 6 per cent band. The band was revised upwards in 1993 to a plus or
minus 15 per cent. The methods of intervention varied from the application of
various domestic policies to outright buying and selling of national currencies which
was supported through the provision of credit facilities.
Bundus (1990) and Phillips (1990) highlighted the credit facilities which were
classified into three categories, namely the very short-term facility, the shortterm monetary support facility and the medium term financing facility.
While the very short term facility required the participating states’ central banks to
provide unlimited and automatic credit to a member whose exchange rate required
immediate intervention, the short term monetary support credit facility, on the other
hand, was based on the value of an assigned creditor quota or debtor quota when
faced with temporary balance of payments deficit or a sudden short-fall in external
reserves. The medium term financial assistance also provided loans for supporting a
more serious balance of payments problem. The credit fund provided was ECU 25
billion, comprising ECU 14 and ECU 11 billion short-term monetary support and
medium term financing facilities, respectively. The EMCF was an ECU fund
established to facilitate the settlement of transactions. In other words, the fund was
used for providing ECUs for gold and dollar deposits. According to Lopex-Claros
(1987), average inflation rate for all members of the ERM fell steadily from 11.3 per
cent in 1980 to 2.5 per cent in 1986.

Phillips (1990) concluded that, the EMS

facilitated increased convergence in areas of prices, real output and money supply.
Therefore, the EMS enhanced exchange rate management, stability and greater
monetary cooperation among member states.
IV.2 Introduction of the Single Act
The Single Act which was ratified in 1985 was aimed at eliminating all factors capable
of inhibiting the realization of a common market. The act targeted the removal of
fiscal, technical and physical barriers that lingered on after tariff barriers had been
dismantled in the 1960s. The Single Act also amended portions of the European
treaties, of which the most significant was the scrapping of the use of veto power or
obtaining unanimity of members on any issue. This was replaced with a single
majority voting to accelerate the speed of decision-making (Dolan, 1990).

Also,

sanctions were swiftly imposed to accelerate the speed of implementation all over. It
is important to note here that, prior to the Single Act (and in spite of the success
achieved in the removal of tariff barriers), most of Europe still retained the identities
of their national markets. Thus, the Single Act was crucial for the development of an
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Europe-wide market that fostered and deepened financial intermediation across
boundaries.

It was also designed to promote Europe-wide money and capital

markets that are necessary requirements for the effective conduct of monetary policy
and overall policy coordination.
IV.3. The Strategic Plans of the Delors’ Committee
In 1988, the Heads of Government constituted a technical committee of central
banks’ governors which was headed by the then President of the European
Commission, Mr. Jacques Delors, to draw up concrete plans that could lead to the
attainment of the EMU (Bundus, 1990). The Delors’ Committee proposed a threeprong approach to an EMU. First, the Committee proposed a plan for the EEC
members (now EU) who were not in the ERM (e.g. United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain
and Greece) to join. France, Italy and Belgium; Spain and Ireland; and Portugal
which had not completed the requirements of the Single Act in 1986 were requested
to abolish completely vestiges of exchange and capital controls by 1990, 1992 and
1994, respectively.
The second plan of the Delors’ Committee was the development of an European
System of Central Banks (ESCB) fashioned like the Federal Reserve System of the
United States (US). It also included the strengthening of policy coordination, as
inspired by the EMS scheme, through the setting of economic targets and rules on
budget deficit for member states.
The third plan required the establishment of a common central bank that would be
charged with the responsibility for the design, formulation and implementation of
monetary policy on behalf of member states. The plan also included the introduction
of a single currency which would symbolize the attainment of a complete monetary
union. Given the necessary approval for the plans, the Delors’ Committee published
the planned strategies in 1989 and commenced the implementation of the plans in
stages from 1990.

Consequently, in 1992, a major step taken by the European

Commission, which was supported by Mr. Helmut Kohl of Germany and Francois
Mitterrand of France who provided the political will to spearhead the integration
efforts, was the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty.
IV.4. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992
The Maastricht Treaty was an important landmark in the build-up towards the
attainment of the EMU.

Elements of the Maastricht Treaty referred to as the
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“convergence criteria”, included targets for inflation, long-term interest rate; budget
deficit, national debt and exchange rate which partly represented details of the Delors
Committee’s second stage plan. Member states willing to form EMU must pursue
macroeconomic policies that would meet the target of 2.3 and 9.1 per cent for
inflation rate and long-term interest rate, respectively, by 1996.

The long term

interest rate should not be more than 2 percentage points more than the average for
the states. Also, participating countries must trim budget deficits to 3 per cent of
their GDPs; and the ratio of gross national debt to GDP should not be higher than 60
per cent. Finally, the exchange rates of participating states must conform with the
requirements of the EMS, particularly the ERMI in 1996.
The Maastricht Treaty requirements were directed at ensuring that countries
embarked on economic reforms or restructuring exercises which would harmonize
the economic indicators of member states to the same base level. In other words,
macroeconomic aggregates of member countries must on the average be homogenous
to facilitate a healthy commencement of a monetary union. The convergence criteria,
therefore, served as a leveler and provided a level playing field for the economies of
member countries, such that the effects of the application of common monetary and
exchange rate policies would be measured and evaluated based on the same
macroeconomic fundamentals. If such economic cleansings were not done in order
to smoothen out the existence of divergent macroeconomic aggregates of member
countries, the application of the same policy measures across would have varying
degrees of impact. Those that had bad economies in place would be worse hit by
common policies than those with relatively healthier ones. The possibility of wide
variation of policy impacts could therefore trigger problems of incompatibility among
the participating states. While some will be growing and progressing faster, others
could be lagging behind or retrogressing as the case may be.
IV.5. The Drive to The Attainment of The European Monetary Union
(EMU)
The basis for participating in EMU was the achievement of the convergence criteria.
The most controversial aspect of the convergence criteria was the requirement for
governments to reduce considerably their budget deficits. To reinforce the blue-print
of the Maastricht Treaty’s budget deficit requirement of not more than 3 per cent of
GDP, unless a country was under an exceptional circumstance when its GDP was
falling at an annual rate of 2 per cent, the EU introduced the “Growth and Stability
Pact”.
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The Growth and Stability Pact

The Growth and Stability Pact, which was agreed upon in December 1996, was
ratified by the European Council in June 1997. The pact provides that any country
that circumvented the rule faces a heavy fine through a majority vote of member
governments. The limit placed on public borrowing was to ensure policy
complementarity between fiscal and monetary policies. Specifically, it was designed
to curb governments easing of fiscal policy through budget deficits capable of
undermining the effectiveness of monetary and exchange rate policies. However, in
the face of rising levels of unemployment, declining capacity utilization and growth,
some of the participating governments were unhappy with the rigidity or strictness of
the stability pact. Facing such economic circumstance, they require budget as a
means of stabilizing their economies through deficit financing. Since they had no
control over monetary policy, the Stability Pact rather constrained the flexibility with
which they could use fiscal policy to address a number of domestic problems. This
led to various complaints, for instance, Germany’s former Finance Minister, Mr.
Oskar Lafontaine resigned his appointment after he had challenged the ECB openly
on this matter. Most of the governments have chosen to raise taxes in order to escape
the stability pact penalty.
On November 25, 2003, the penalty for violating the Growth and Stability Pact failed
to pass the acid test, as France and Germany, which had exceeded the 3 per cent
minimum deficit requirement, lobbied other member states to overturn the punitive
measures recommended by the European Commission. This dimension established a
dangerous precedence for which the embattled Commission has decided to take a
legal action in order to upturn that political decision.
EMU Convergence Criteria Test and the Cessation of the EMI

In spite of the controversy generated by the Growth and Stability Pact, participating
countries strove hard to meet the convergence criteria by 1996, the reference year.
However, the test to determine which countries qualified to participate in EMU was
fixed for May, 1998, using the performance of 1997(see Table 1). The European
Commission and the EMI in March 1998 submitted their recommendations to the
European Council which selected 11 out of the 15 members of the EU that met the test
requirements.
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The Position of Non-EMU Countries

As discussed in part 2, only three countries, namely Britain, Denmark and Sweden
were outside the EMU construct before the admission of the 10 new members to the
EU. As for Denmark and Sweden, they opted for EMU but failed the eligibility test as
indicated by the outcome of their convergence criteria performance. Consequently,
they needed to improve on their performances in order to gain admission into the
EMU. Greece in 2005, formally scaled through the hurdle and was admitted into the
EMU. Britain, on the other hand, opted out of EMU arrangement largely on account
of being unable to reach a political consensus on EMU. Among the reasons adduced
is the loss of its national sovereignty and identity, as well as the nationalistic
sentiments attached to the British pound sterling. If the pound sterling would not be
adopted as the single currency and will be phased out, Britons find it hard to admit
the reality of parting way with the sterling regarded, not only as a symbol of unity and
economic strength, but also the pride of losing one of the foremost reputable
currencies of the world. Besides, there is still an on-going controversy on the merits
and demerits of joining the EMU (Wall Street Journal Europe and The Economist,
1999). Those opposing Britain’s entry into the EMU often argue that the application
of a common monetary policy for economies of varying conditions of boom and
slump, limitation of the stability pact and the inflexibility of labour and product
markets in Europe, will create more strains on these economies.
According to the group in favour of Britain joining the EMU, the sterling will be
opened to speculative attacks as long as it remains pegged to the euro; Britain will
lose about 40 per cent of direct investment (The Economist, April 1999), companies
in Britain will face exchange rate risks and high transaction costs. Britain will lose
out in the proposed merger of the London and Frankfurt stock exchanges with the
head office in London, and its influence will dwindle in the continent it if fails to join
the EMU. The result of an opinion pool reported in the Economist (April 1999),
indicated that 65 per cent of Britons favoured joining the EMU; and by late 2001 or
in 2002, it was expected that Britons would go to the poll to decide whether or not
Britain should join the EMU. This has not happened. The ten new states which
joined the EU in May 2004, will also have to pass the convergence criteria test to be
admitted into the EMU.
The Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II)

The importance of exchange rate stability for promoting intra-European trade and
investment cannot be over-emphasized as evidenced in the EMS arrangements.

Sagbamah: Perspectives on the European Monetary Union
However, with the introduction of the euro, the ECU and ERMI arrangements
ceased; but the exchange rates of the non-EMU countries could be volatile,
transmitting negatively on the EMU zone. Consequently, the ERM I arrangement was
transformed into ERM II for the non-EMU countries, referred to as the derogation
countries (countries that are outside the EMU zone). The necessity for the ERM II
arrangement stems from the fact that, it would discourage the derogation countries
from embarking on deliberate devaluation with a view to securing competitive
advantage over the EMU members. Such actions would not only undermine the
competitiveness of the EMU countries, but will also create undue tension in the EU.
Consequently, the ERM II, which was ratified by the European Council in December
1996 for the derogation countries, commenced effectively in January 1999 after the
introduction of the euro. The euro, therefore, became the anchor currency which the
currencies of the derogation countries are fixed to with margins of plus or minus 15
per cent. Fluctuation outside the margins would require intervention by the central
banks of the non-EMU countries and serves as a condition for joining the EMU by the
derogation countries.
The Design and Introduction of the Euro

A major hallmark of a complete monetary integration is the introduction and use of a
single currency by all participating countries. There are two options to this. The
countries either agree to adopt a strong currency of a member country or design a
new currency for member countries. In the case of the EMU, member countries
opted for a new currency and in 1995, the European Council in conjunction with the
EMI and the European Commission selected the name euro among other names. By
December 1996 and June 1997, the designs of the euro bank notes and coins by the
EMI in conjunction with the European Commission were ratified by the European
Council. Consequently, seven bank notes and eight coins of various denominations
were approved for circulation. The coins are 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50 euro cents, 1 and 2
euros, while the notes are 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200 and 500 euros. Thereafter, the
official ECU ceased to exist, the ERM II became operational, and the ECB
commenced operations to discharge its mandate, the conduct of a common monetary
policy in the euro zone.
IV.6. The Implications of the Introduction of The Euro
The withdrawal of national currencies for the euro, which remains the only currency
for the union, had some implications. These are discussed below:
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Currency Implications
On January 1, 2002, the formal exchange of the national currencies of the 11
participating countries for the euro had serious currency implications. All national
currencies were on July 1, 2002, withdrawn from circulation, leaving the euro as the
only currency of transactions and, thus, the legal tender of a population of over 304
million people, comparable to the 260 and 125 million people for the United States
dollar and Japanese yen, respectively. The amount of euro that was received by
individuals and corporate bodies depended on the balances of national currencies
outstanding to their credit and the relative strength of these currencies’ exchange
rates to the euro. The EMU countries bore the costs of introducing the euro which
included legal, administrative, old notes withdrawal, automatic teller machines
replacement, retraining of staff and publicity campaigns. The transactions cost of
contracts or projects were redenominated in euro according to the worth of the
former national currencies, while prices of goods and services declined after the
change in currencies to levels where similar products and services were offered at
competitive cheaper rates. Also, the payments system remained unchanged, using
existing facilities, particularly the SWIFT technology, and was further enhanced by
the Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement Express Transfer
(TARGET) introduced to achieve settlement of same day payment under any
circumstance.

These were expected to increase the efficiency of intra-European

cross-border payments and ensure the smooth conduct of monetary policy in the
EMU.
Implications for the Money Market
The introduction of the euro integrated the inter-bank markets, increased the size
and reduced costs associated with different inter-bank markets. Under the same
monetary policy for all institutions, the money market in Europe became the second
largest market following that of the United States. Furthermore, the variety of money
market securities and products that now exist further deepened the EMU money
market. These products and securities were reconciled among banks through the
instrumentality of the ECU Banking Association (EBA), renamed Euro Banking
Association, which represents the institution for banks’ clearing system. The existing
interest rates were realigned as the strong economies with low interest rates exerted
considerable influence on the interest rates structure, thus reducing interest rates to
converge on Euribor (European Inter-bank Offer Rate).

Sagbamah: Perspectives on the European Monetary Union
Implications for the Capital Market
The immediate implication for the capital market was the conversion of the existing
share prices into euro, while new shares are being quoted in euro. In effect, the
existing stock exchanges maintained their identities within the European capital
market. However, an European-wide capital market competition certainly brought
about the harmonization of market conventions, which not only ensured efficiency
and market deepening, but also led to the consolidation or mergers of some of the 39
existing stock exchanges. Besides, the elimination of exchange rate risks, declining
costs of trading and settlement, as well as low inflation rate, attracted capital inflow,
thus, enlarging the European capital market which competes favourably with the
New York and Tokyo stock exchanges.
Implications for the Foreign Exchange Market
The introduction of the euro and the withdrawal of the old national currencies had
significant impact on the foreign exchange market.

First, costs associated with

differences in exchange rates were eliminated; second, exchange rate risks which
were associated with the fluctuations in exchange rates of national currencies were
also removed. These savings influenced the reduction of prices in member countries.
Foreign exchange transactions and record-keeping are more simplified in the euro
zone as all member countries are dealing with a single currency, the euro. The
prospects of well developed and competitive money and foreign exchange markets
further promoted and deepened the activities of the derivatives market.
Implications for Reserves Management
The euro is not only floating against other international currencies (dollar, Yen, etc),
but also pegged against the currencies of the derogation countries (non-EMU
members). In the light of these, the ECB needs foreign reserves backing for the
effective management of the euro in the foreign exchange market to achieve the
objectives of monetary policy. Consequently, national central banks had to transfer
some of their reserves holdings to the ECB to facilitate the discharge of its mandates.
The percentage contribution by member countries was arrived at through the
estimation of their respective reserves/imports ratios. This estimation provided the
initial required reserves needed for the EMU project, which was proportional to each
member’s national reserves.
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Implications for Policy Formulation and Implementation
In order to lay a solid economic foundation, the EMU countries strengthened their
economic base through a package of convergence criteria implemented by all
countries. These were stringent economic measures designed to smoothen all
countries’ economies across board, preparatory for the introduction of the euro and,
thus, the conduct of monetary policy. To achieve them, the countries had to
undertake a number of economic reforms, which included government budget
rationalization. Also, they had to surrender their national powers to the ECB in the
design and implementation of monetary and exchange rate policies. These portend
serious policy implications to national governments in some respects. For instance, if
a government has every justifiable reason to run a budget deficit, it does not control
the monetary instruments to complement its efforts. Besides, attempt at borrowing
could lead to higher interest rate for other countries.
Implications for the CFA Franc Countries
France and its colonies had since the 1930s maintained a monetary cooperation
arrangement which metamorphosed into the introduction of a common currency, the
CFA franc in 1948. The CFA franc which is issued separately by both the Western
African Economic Monetary Union (UEMOA) and Central African Economic and
Monetary Union (CEMAC) was pegged at a fixed parity against the French franc; this
implicitly indicated a fixed exchange rate regime for the two monetary unions
existing in the CFA zone. The agreed fixed exchange rate can be adjusted only if some
adverse economic conditions exist and a mutual agreement for an adjustment is
reached between the colonies and France. France also provides a guarantee for the
CFA franc, thus, conferring on it the status of a convertible currency (Hadjimichael
and Galy, 1977). However, the replacement of the French franc for the euro to which
the CFA franc was pegged, has some important implications for France and its
colonies. Specifically, what happens to the peg and the guarantee of France? Will the
EMU countries accept these arrangements between France and its colonies? The
ERM II arrangement is designed to facilitate currency cooperation between the EMU
and the derogation countries. Besides, the EMU provisions allow for the negotiation
of any currency arrangement with a country or group of countries. In these regards,
the EMU can accommodate the CFA countries on terms and conditions agreed by
both parties. Indeed, the CFA zone countries are willing to maintain the peg and
France guarantee of the convertibility status of the CFA franc. Maintaining the peg to
the euro does not constitute any problem as any adjustment in the fixed rate was
based on the rate at which the French franc had been converted into the euro.
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However, the area of problem is guaranteeing the convertibility of the CFA franc, as
this may have some implications on France and the EMU countries. The guarantee
arrangement is supported by France’s Treasury rather than its Central Bank. In other
words, under a tight budgetary condition, France may have to borrow from the
domestic economy to meet euro obligations of its colonies. This could have adverse
effect on domestic interest rate and, thus, interest rate management by the ECB.
However, as long as the above condition does not exist and France meets the
financial requirements of its colonies, the replacement of French franc with euro has
little or no implications on the EMU.
In summary, so long as EMU supports currency cooperation arrangement, and the
replacement of French franc with euro has no adverse implications, coupled with the
fact that the monetary unions in the CFA zone maintain 65 per cent of their reserves
in the French Treasury, France and her colonies have continued to wax stronger in
sustaining the currency cooperation agreements.

V
V.1

Ecowas Monetary Integration Efforts and the Lessons from
the EU Experience

Historical Evolution of the Economic Community of West African

States
The processes that were undertaken to achieve the EMU are indeed very instructive.
It is worthy of note that it took the European countries 13 years (1957-1970) to
initiate the need to advance further into a monetary union following the
implementation of a common market. Thereafter, Europe attained the EMU in 29
years (1970-1999); however, if we count from 1957 when the idea was mooted and the
processes commenced, then it took Europe 42 years (1957-1999) to achieve the EMU.
In the West African sub-region, the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) was established on May 28, 1975. Sixteen (16) countries, namely, Benin,
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Liberia, Guinea Bissau,
Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo
signed the membership of ECOWAS. Following the withdrawal of Mauritania in
December 2000, the membership dropped to fifteen (15). The major objective of
ECOWAS is to establish a common market and create a monetary union.
Both the common market and the need for a monetary union commenced
concurrently in 1975.

The establishment of the West African Clearing House

(WACH) in 1975 was aimed at promoting some degree of monetary co-operation. In
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other words, it has taken ECOWAS 30 years in pursuing the ideals of a monetary
union. As against the EU experience, the ECOWAS integration process inadvertently
commenced simultaneously with a limited degree of monetary union (monetary cooperation programme). However, the formal move for the formation of a monetary
union was agreed in May 1983, which led to the reinforcement of the existing
monetary co-operation programme into a comprehensive ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Programme (EMCP) in July, 1987.

The formation of the EMCP was

preceded by the works of a study group, commissioned by the Committee of
Governors of Central Banks, aimed at proposing in concrete terms, the methodology
for achieving a monetary union. The report of the study group and the implications
thereof, which were submitted in 1984, proposed a number of measures for the
establishment of a common currency and, hence, a monetary union. Thereafter, a
supplementary study aimed at articulating the various adjustment issues, such as
fiscal, monetary, reserves and currency convertibility, which should be undertaken by
member states, was also commissioned. This report which was submitted in 1986,
proposed a five-year transitional period for the attainment of a single monetary zone
by 1992.
In 1987, the ECOWAS Heads of State approved the EMCP, but opted for a gradual
and phased approach to a monetary union. Consequently, the EMCP was phased into
short, medium and long term programmes for the implementation of reforms and
adjustment issues towards achieving a single currency by 2000. The short term
programme which had a time frame of 1991-1994, was aimed at strengthening and
improving the operational efficiency of the WACH through measures which included,
the settlement of WACH trade arrears, introduction of new payment instruments
(ECOWAS Traveller’s cheque and Bills of Exchange), establishment of a credit
guarantee fund, the transformation of WACH into a specialized monetary agency
(which is now known as the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA) and the removal
of non-tariff barriers(Obaseki 2001). These measures were introduced to boost the
capacity and thus the operational capabilities of the WACH.
Furthermore, the medium term programme which had a time frame of 1994-1997,
was intended to achieve regional currency convertibility and market-based exchange
rates. This also included the intensification of the complete implementation of the
trade liberalization measures, and the implementation of the monetary, fiscal and
external adjustment measures. The long term programme envisaged that, between
1997-2000 time frame, all the adjustment issues for meeting the convergence criteria,
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which were necessary for the introduction of a single currency for the sub-region,
would have been completed.

However, unfortunately, the EMCP programme of

actions was not realized by the terminal date of 2000. Thus, the terminal date was
revised to 2005, while members were expected to expedite actions and implement
speedily, all outstanding measures for the establishment of a common bank (West
African Central Bank) and the introduction of a common currency to facilitate intraregional trade and the conduct of a common monetary policy.
V.2

Institutional Developments of the ECOWAS

The institutions to achieve the objective of ECOWAS are the Authority of Heads of
State and Government, the Council of Ministers; the Parliament; the Court of Justice;
the Convergence Council; the Committee of Governors of Central Banks; the
Technical Monitoring Committee, the Joint Secretariat of WAMA and the ECOWAS
Executive Secretariat; National Coordinating Committees (NCC); the Executive
Secretariat; and specialized institutions such as the West African Clearing House
(WACH), transformed into the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA). Other
specialized institutions are the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development
Group and the West African Health Organisation; the West African Institute for
Financial and Economic Management (WAIFEM) and the West African Bankers’
Association (WABA).
V.2.1 Political Institutions
The Authority of Heads of State and Government
The highest ruling body that makes decisions on policies, programmes, projects and
critical issues affecting the development of ECOWAS regional integration.
The Council of Ministers
Deliberates to fine-tune and presents policies, programmes and projects for the
approval of the Authority of Heads of State and Government and also takes
responsibility for ensuring that policies, programmes and projects are developed to
achieve the objectives of ECOWAS.
ECOWAS Parliament: Enacts laws for governing the operations of the
Community.
ECOWAS Court of Justice: It adjudicates cases between and among member
states.
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ECOWAS Executive Secretariat: Prepares and implements the decisions of the
Authority of Heads of States and Government, and also the regulations of the Council
of Ministers.
V.2.2 Technical Institutions
The Convergence Council
The Council comprises Ministers of Finance and Governors of Central Banks of
member state and is empowered to conduct multilateral surveillance of the
convergence criteria of member states. The Convergence Council reports to the
Authority of Heads of State and Government.
Committee of Governors of Central Banks
They direct the technical committee of experts on issues to facilitate the
implementation of decisions and overall development of monetary integration. They
are directly responsible to the

Convergence Council and the Council of Ministers.

Technical Monitoring Committee
The Committee, which consist of representatives of the Ministers of Finance and
Directors of Research of central banks of member states, shall monitor the
convergence process of member states and supervise the work carried out by WAMA,
ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and the National Coordinating Committees on the
implementation of the convergence programme. The Committee shall prepare
progress reports for the Convergence Council.
Joint Secretariat (WAMA and ECOWAS Executive Secretariat)
The Joint Secretariat prepares meetings of the Technical Monitoring Committee and
the Convergence Council on multilateral surveillance mechanism database and
prepares half yearly progress reports to the Technical Monitoring Committee and the
Convergence Council.
National Coordinating Committees (NCC)
The NCC shall assist WAMA and the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat in the collection,
processing and analysis of data on economic policies and the performance of the
convergence criteria. The NCC shall forward the report of its activities to the
Executive Secretariat on quarterly basis. Indeed, the Convergence Council, the
Committee of Governors of Central Banks, Technical Monitoring Committee and the
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NCC Constitute the institutions for regional surveillance mechanism for the purpose
of coordinating national economic policies to achieve the convergence of national
economies.
V.2.3 Specialized institutions
The West African Clearing House (WACH)
This was established on June 25, 1975 to serve as a clearing house for the settlement
of payments made for goods and services, using local currencies of member states. It
commenced operations in July 1976 in Freetown Sierra Leone, but inability to
promote and also achieve the major objective of monetary cooperation resulted in its
transformation into the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA) on August 8, 1996.
The West African Monetary Agency (WAMA)
To achieve the mandate of promoting monetary cooperation, WAMA has the
expanded responsibility or objective of promoting trade liberalization, harmonizing
fiscal and monetary policies, managing exchange rate system and ECOWAS
Travellers’ Cheque system, and providing multilateral surveillance mechanism to
achieve monetary cooperation and, thus, monetary union.
ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development Group (EBID)
The EBID which comprises two subsidiaries, namely the ECOWAS Regional
Investment Bank (ERIB) for private sector financing and the ECOWAS
Regional

Development

Fund

(ERDF)

for

public

sector

financing,

metamorphosed from ECOWAS Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and
Development (ECOWAS Fund). The failure of ECOWAS Fund to achieve the
objectives of financing the execution of development projects, providing grants for
feasibility studies and guarantees for foreign investments, facilitating the
mobilization of internal and external resources for member states and providing
compensation to member states which suffer losses as a result of the implementation
of the integration policy, contributed to the transformation into EBID. However, the
Fund’s problems were attributed largely to the inability to function as a international
financial institution to cope with the volume of activities in the ECOWAS sub-region,
poor institutional capacity owing to staff quota system, lack of corporate culture and
managerial expertise, low financial resource mobilization and limited project
execution (EBID Group, 2005). Thus, the two subsidiaries would therefore mobilize
for the Community both internal and external financial resources for financing both
private and public sectors’ projects and promote the development of the sub-region.
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West African Institute for Financial and Economic Management
(WAIFEM): It is set up to build capacity on economic and financial management for
member states.
West African Bankers’ Association (WABA): An umbrella association for
bankers in the subregion to promote their activities.
West African Health Organisation (WAHO): The organization promotes
matters on health, especially HIV/AIDS, malaria, etc.
Special Technical Commissions
There are eight commissions which prepare Community programmes and projects
and coordinate their implementation after approval. These are Food; Industry,
Science & Technology and Energy; Environment and National Resources; Transport,
Communication and Tourism; Trade, Customs, Taxation, Statistics, Money and
Payments; Political, Judicial & Legal, Regional Security and Immigration Affairs;
Human Resources, Information, Social and Cultural Affairs; and Administration and
Finance (EBID) Group, 2005).
V.3 ECOWAS’ Programmes and Projects
ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Programme
The ECOWAS trade liberalization Scheme (ETLS) commenced on January 1, 1990.
The Scheme aims at developing a customs union for a period of 15 years (Owolabi,
2004). Thus, the ETLS seeks to eliminate customs duties, taxies and other non-tariff
barriers to facilitate the free flow of trade in the subregion. The continued existence
of different customs declarations and valuation methods, numerous check points on
roads and sea ports, lack of transportation and telecommunication networks and
non-harmonisation of trade and investment policies have impeded trade in goods
and services as well as human and capital mobility. These inadequacies are a
reflection of countries unwillingness to implement the ETLS faithfully.
ECOWAS Travellers’ Cheque Scheme
To enhance payment mechanism in the sub-region and promote trade, the ECOWAS
Travellers’ Cheque (ETC) was introduced in 1998 as a settlement instrument. The
operations of the ETC have been suspended and efforts are being made to transfer its
operations to the private sector. The ETC was denominated in the West African Unit
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of Account (WAUA) which facilitated the conversion between and among local
currencies through cross rates.
ECOWAS Energy and Highway Projects
Two major energy projects are being implemented in the sub-region. These are the
West African Gas Pipeline and the Energy Power Pool projects. The West
African Gas Pipeline project (WAGP) is being constructed by Nigeria and its joint
venture partners (Chevron, Texaco and Shell Petroleum Development Company); the
Volta River Authority of Ghana; the Sobe Gas of Benin; and the Soto Gas of Togo. The
project which is estimated to cost about US$530 million will supply gas from Nigeria
to the Republics of Benin, Togo and Ghana (Nwachukwu and Etentuk, 2004). It is
envisaged that the West African Gas Pipeline Company (WAGPCO) will in the future
extend the pipeline to other West African Countries, thus reducing the cost of energy
to consumers in the sub-region. Similarly, arrangements are on-going under the
energy power pool to construct and interconnect electricity grid lines throughout the
West African sub-region. Another major project that has reached an advanced stage
is the construction of the West African Highway Project from Nigeria to Senegal.
These are intended to provide infrastructural development for the promotion of
productive activities in the sub-region.
ECOWAS Common Policies
The Community has approved Common Agricultural

Policy (CAP) and Common

Industrial Policy (CIP) to provide level playing fields for agricultural and industrial
activities across the sub-region.
Regional Security
The Community has implemented a number of peace initiatives, including the peace
keeping force called ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). In this regard, the
Community has successfully intervened in the wars and crises in Liberia, Sierra
Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, etc.
V.4

The Fast Track Approach to Integration and the Birth of The West
African Monetary Zone (WAMZ)

The difficulties in achieving the ECOWAS monetary integration owed partly to the
entrenched dichotomies among the Francophone, Anglophone and Portugese
colonies in the sub-region.

The Francophone countries have a West African

Economic and Monetary Union known as UEMOA, which is regarded as more viable
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than any other integration arrangement involving other countries in the sub-region.
Therefore, its members undermine efforts at achieving the ECOWAS integration. To
meet the challenges posed by the Francophone UEMOA, the Anglophone countries
and Guinea, which though a Francophone colony but not a member of UEMOA,
thought it fit to have their own parallel umbrella union not only to serve as a basis for
comparison, but a necessary antidote that would foster an early convergence, fusion
and attainment of an ECOWAS-wide monetary union. Consequently, in its meeting
held from 20th - 21st December, 1999, popularly known as the Accra declaration,
Nigeria and Ghana initiated the Fast Track approach to integration. Since then, the
participating countries have risen to six, which include the Gambia, Guinea, Liberia
and Sierra Leone; and in December 2000, the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ)
was established as the second monetary zone.
The objective is to facilitate rapid integration of the non-UEMOA countries into a
monetary union. The convergence criteria which the six countries must satisfy to
form the second monetary union include a single digit inflation rate of 5 per cent, a
budget deficit/GDP ratio of 4 per cent, reduction of Central Bank deficit financing to
10 per cent of the previous year’s tax revenue and a healthy reserves to imports ratio
of 3 to 6 months. These were to be achieved by 2002 and a common currency was to
be introduced in 2003 to commence the monetary union. However, the failure to
achieve the convergence criteria has led to series of postponements from 2003 to
2004, 2005 and now to December 1, 2009. According to Ashante (2001), the Fast
Track group commands about 69 per cent (152 million people) of the population, 66
per cent of the gross domestic product ($52,475 million), 68 per cent of total trade
($29,534 million) and 65 per cent of reserves within the ECOWAS group. Thus, the
Fast Track group now represents a formidable arm of the ECOWAS group.
V.4.1

Institutional Developments for the WAMZ

V.4.1.1 Political and Technical Institutions
In the WAMZ group, some of the institutional arrangements discussed under the
ECOWAS group are also replicated. These are the Authority of Heads of State
and Government, the Council of Ministers or Forum of Finance
Ministers, the Convergence Council, the Committee of Governors of
Central Banks, the Technical Committee, Joint Secretariat (WAMI and
WAMZ Secretariat) and the National Sensitization Committee (NSC). The
NSC is the equivalent of the ECOWAS NCC, but it is also mandated to carry out
sensitization campaigns in each member state.
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Under the WMAZ group, they constituted Expert Working Groups to tackle
specific technical issues. The meetings of the three Expert Working Groups
deliberated on the WAMZ Work Programme and proposed action plans for the
successful implementation of the Work Programme before December 1, 2009, date
for monetary union.
Expert Working Group 1: It worked on macroeconomic convergence, statistical
harmonization and database development, financial integration, creation of customs
union and programmes for promoting regional development and integration.
Expert Working Group 2: It examined the development of zonal payments and
settlements systems for cross border transactions, preparation towards the
introduction of ECO and the national sensitization programmes.
Expert Working Group 3: It discussed the action plans for the ratification of the
WAMZ legal instrument and the activation of the WAMZ institutions such as the
West African Central Bank (WACB), the West African Financial and Supervisory
Authority (WAFSA), the Stabilization Cooperation Fund (SCF) and the WAMZ
Secretariat.
The implementation of these action plans would lead to the achievements of the Real
time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System as a payments mechanism, common
macroeconomic

database,

capital

account

liberalization,

regional

currency

convertibility, harmonization of financial and banking laws, common external tariff,
ECOWAS trade liberalization scheme, harmonization of customs and ports
procedures, sensitization, currency design and introduction of currency on December
1, 2009. Each policy, programme and project initiated by the expert working group
passes through the hierarchy from the Technical Committee, Committee of
Governors, and Council of Ministers for fine-turning before presentation to the
Authority of Heads of States and Government for approval.
V .4.1.2 Specialized Institutions of the WAMZ
West African Monetary Institute (WAMI)
The Institute which was established in 2001, is saddled with the responsibility of
preparing the grounds for and expected to metamorphose into the West African
Central Bank (WACB) to conduct monetary and exchange rate policies, manage
reserves, provide banking statistics and ensure an efficient payments system when
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the second monetary zone would have commenced operations. By 2009, the existing
monetary unions (UEMOA and WAMZ) are expected to decide on a formal date for a
merger to form a single monetary zone with a common currency and central bank for
the ECOWAS.
West African Central Bank (WACB)
The Bank with proposal to locate its headquarters in Ghana is expected to commence
operations on December 1, 2009. It will be responsible for the conduct of monetary
policy for the WAMZ group.
West African Financial Supervisory Authority (WAFSA)
The WAFSA is to be located in Nigeria and will coordinate other activities of central
banking such as banking operations, supervision, etc.
Stabilization and Cooperation Fund: The Fund will be used to provide credit
facilities for countries in temporary balance of payments crisis.
WAMZ Secretariat: The Secretariat which is being proposed for Guinea will
provide administrative functions to facilitate effective implementation and
coordination of the WAMZ programmes.
V.5

Comparative Analysis and the EU’S Lessons of Experience for the

ECOWAS
The foregoing analysis provides a brief historical background of the ECOWAS efforts
at integrating its economies into a monetary union. What follows is a comparative
analysis of the EU and ECOWAS integration processes to monetary unions in which
the lessons of experience from the EU success story would be drawn to guide the
ECOWAS integration. To do these, the analysis would be segmented into different
levels of integration.
Political Integration
The integration of nations into a political and economic entity requires enormous
political will on the part of the leadership. The will to carry the people along,
implement common decisions, open territorial boundaries for citizens of other
countries to undertake socio-economic activities and surrender some aspects of their
national sovereignty is critical and important if any integration must succeed. This is
indeed challenging, as the implementation of common policy measures could
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contradict a nation’s internal political and economic interests. Political integration
provides the force which unites, facilitates and generates interest in implementing
common policy measures. In the EU experience, France and Germany spearheaded
and provided the leadership drive that galvanized and encouraged the leaders of
others countries to embrace and promote the ideals of the EU integration. Even
when Britain opted out, the leaders of these two countries sacrificed themselves to
provide needed political leadership for others to follow and achieve political
integration at both national and intra-regional levels.
In the ECOWAS sub-region, most leaders lack the political will and competence to
implement their own national economic policy reforms let alone those prescribed at
regional level. These are the direct results of poor leadership selection methods that
breed frequent crises which are common phenomena in the sub-region. The
consequence being the emergence of leaders who lack the political will and
commitment, fail to provide the basic needs of the people, but in perpetual conflict
and crises with the followership and pay lip service rhetorically to the ideals of a
monetary union. Furthermore, the strong tie of countries in the sub-region to their
colonial roots (Francophone, Anglophone and Portuguese territories) has tended to
fractionalize countries into these dichotomies, leaving behind a political vacuum that
is inimical to political integration.
Social Integration
Even if the integrating countries have the political will and provide the leadership
required for a well-focused integration process, their ability or inability to carry the
people along would have profound effect on the success of the integration
programmes. In this regard, the enlightenment and full participation of citizens of
the integrating countries are basic requirements for eliciting their support, and gain
their confidence in the integration process. Thus, social integration of the people
involves massive media enlightenment campaigns designed not only for sensitizing
people on the programmes of integration, but also for drawing attention on the need
for integration and the various benefits derivable in order to gain their total support
for the programmes. This is extremely weak in ECOWAS countries, particularly the
WAMZ countries. The mobilization exercise should embrace people of all professions,
including market women, trade unions, business associations and the academia. The
EMU countries had this experience which fostered support for the integration
process and provided the basis for articulating and resolving some fears and social
concerns.

To allay the fears of minorities, the EU distributed institutions,

67

68

Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and Financial Review

March 2006

infrastructural facilities, projects and development programmes in an even and
equitable manner. Also, the location and staffing of the institutions and sectoral
commissions were fairly distributed to encouraged relatively weaker nations. For
instance, the European Investment Bank is cited in Italy, the structural funds
(consisting of regional, social and agricultural guidance funds) are located in Spain
and the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes which were aimed at galvanizing
support for integration were directed at depressed areas of Europe, including
Southern France, Greece, Spain and Portugal.
Institutional Integration
The importance of institutional support for a successful implementation of any
programme cannot be over-emphasized.

Indeed, institutions are the veritable

medium for decision-making, policy and programme implementation, monitoring,
evaluation and coordination. The significance of institutions and programmes for
achieving the lofty objectives of the EU and EMU informed the need for the
systematic discussions on the various institutions and programmes in parts 2 and 3
of this paper, respectively. Besides, the creation of an enabling environment for
facilitating programmes implementation within and among countries are also
products of institutions.
In the ECOWAS sub-region, and particularly the WAMZ zone, institutional
requirements and capacity for a monetary union are being established, while existing
ones are also undergoing reforms. The major political institutions for overall
integration coordination in ECOWAS are, Authority of Heads of State and
Government (the Council in EU), ECOWAS Parliament (the Assembly in EU),
Council of Ministers, Convergence Council, Committee of Governors and ECOWAS
Secretariat (play the role of Commission in EU) and ECOWAS Court of Justice (Court
of Justice in EU). In the EU, the Commission through Sectoral Commissioners
propose policies, programmes and projects for the ratification of the Council, they
are, therefore, the heart beat of the integration process. In ECOWAS, the Technical
Committee, Special Technical Commission, export working groups play the role of
Sectoral Commission in the EU. However, if the Authority of Heads of State and
Government/ Council of Ministers in ECOWAS lack the political will, commitment
and drive, which their EU counterparts had and still have, then the integration
process in ECOWAS will remain illusive. Furthermore, other important specialized
institutions such as EMI, ESCB, ECB and EBA provided technical or specialized
functions to facilitate the integration process. The counterparts of these specialized
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institutions in ECOWAS are WAMI/WAMA (EMI in EU), the West African Financial
Supervisory Authority (WAFSA) which is ESCB in EU) proposed for Nigeria and the
West African Central Bank (WACB, which is ECB in EU) proposed for Ghana are still
in the process of being established. Apart from WAMI which is already functional, the
WAFSA and WACB will commence operations only at the threshold of
WAMZ/ECOWAS becoming a monetary union. The basic differences between the EU
institutions and their counterparts in ECOWAS are that ECOWAS institutions suffer
from lack of commitment, inadequate funding and staffing, thus becoming glorified
institutions. Nevertheless, it would be merely wishful to think that WAMI alone can
bring about a monetary union. Indeed, WAMI only provides technical guides and
relies entirely on sovereign governments on which it has no statutory powers to
enforce compliance to perform.

Furthermore, as in the EU arrangement, each

national central bank retains its independence to perform other operational aspects
of central banking such as money market operations, funds transfer, issuance of
banknotes, management of reserves, lender of last resort, prudential supervision, etc,
which are distinct from the conduct of monetary policy that would be ceded to the
WACB when it commences operations in December 2009. Furthermore, the national
central banks will form the WAFSA as the central body for the coordination of their
operational functions which will provide inputs for feeding the WACB. Therefore, as
the EU model indicates, the existence of the proposed WACB does not extinguish or
eliminate the role of national central banks, rather the arrangement still retains a
decentralized central banking structure.
It is worthy of note to mention here that the system of appointing adhoc committees
or expert working groups to tackle or handle policies, programmes and projects for
regional development in the WAMZ should be replaced with permanent Sectoral
Commissions or Sectoral Departments that could be held accountable for
developments in their respective sectors. In this regard, such Sectoral Commissioners
or departments will handle matters on common banking supervision, payments and
settlement system, transportation, communications, trade, agriculture, industry, etc.
Market Integration
One of the fundamental objectives of every economic integration is the achievement
of a single large market. National markets, which are usually inaccessible, owing to
the existence of many barriers which are created to meet the economic, social and
political interests and other exigencies of countries, are opened up through market
integration. The process requires the removal of all barriers that are both tariff and
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non-tariff in nature, to facilitate trade in goods and services, capital and labour
mobility, as well as promote investment and production. The larger the size of the
market, the greater the level of competition and industrial output resulting from large
scale production. The EU achieved the removal of tariffs in the 1960s, but non-tariff
barriers were eliminated in the late 1980s when the “Single European Act” was
introduced in 1986.

The Schengen Agreement of 1990 was a follow-up for the

elimination of any form of border check. In the ECOWAS, the trade liberalization
scheme has not been fully implemented by many countries. There are still many
trade restrictions, border and road checks, and other corrupt practices by
immigration, customs and other security personnel which militate against market
integration.
Financial Integration
A well-developed financial market, consisting of vibrant money and capital markets,
is essential for the promotion of trade, output growth and overall economic
development. Fortunately, the European financial markets in London, Frankfurt,
Paris, Brussels, etc are highly developed and competitive, with currencies that were
internationally and regionally convertible before the introduction of the euro. The
computerization of financial services and the introduction of a variety of financial
products, internet and e-mail have improved efficiency and service delivery. With the
introduction of the euro, cross-border funds transfer is facilitated through the use of
the Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement Express Transfer
(TARGET) which automatically debits and credits parties to all transactions across
Europe on real time basis.
In this area, the ECOWAS countries have poor money and capital markets, which are
limited by non-convertible currencies, inefficient and outdated payments and
settlement system, weak and absence of uniform banking supervision and capital
market conventions. These are further constrained by poor power supply,
telecommunications and computer facilities, all of which constitute barriers to trade.
Infrastructural Integration
Infrastructure play important role in promoting intra-regional trade and
development. The conscious and collective efforts aimed at standardizing the
development of roads, rail, air and water transportation, energy, water supply and
telecommunications across Europe have aided trade and economic development.
They are indeed critical for rapid trade, financial and production integration in
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Europe. On the other hand, poor power supply, bad roads, poor telecommunications,
lack of ships and planes for water and air transportation, lack of trains for rail
transportation among the ECOWAS countries are serious impediments to effective
integration.
Production Integration
This involves the harmonization and standardization of all production activities in a
region. This led to the rationalization of industries in Europe and the introduction of
common sectoral policies such as Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), Common
Industrial Policy (CIP), Common Iron and Steel Policy under the European Coal and
Steel Community, etc and supported by research and development institutions and
programmes such as RACE, and ARAINE, BRITE, EURATOM, etc, for satellite,
computer and energy, respectfully. The rationalization and standardization of
production through common sectoral policies and supported by research and
development institutions and programmes are issues which have not been sufficiently
addressed in the ECOWAS.
Economic Integration
The processes of institutional, market, financial, infrastructural and production
integrations are the forerunners which lay a solid bedrock of economic integration.
In the case of the EU, these are further supported by specialized funds such as the
European Regional Development Fund, European Agricultural Guidance and
Guarantee Fund, European Investment Bank, European Social Fund, etc, all of which
promote economic growth and development, thus, facilitating economic integration.
However, the transformation into an economic integration takes place when the
economies of member countries are further harmonized into a large economy
through a set of convergence criteria. The criteria which were contained in the
Maastricht treaty of 1992 were implemented by member countries. The failure in
achieving institutional, social, market, financial and production integration, which
serve as basic foundations, has constituted a serious constraint to economic
integration in the ECOWAS. Consequently, meeting the set convergence criteria by
member countries has been a herculean task. Indeed, there have been no consistent
efforts toward realizing the convergence criteria. The performances of countries have
fluctuated remarkably from one year to another; even to the extent that the record of
achievement of two criteria in a country for a particular year may be reversed in the
following year, indicating worsening conditions.
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Monetary Integration
In addition to the requirements for economic integration, the introduction of a
common currency which would necessitate the withdrawal of national currencies
constitutes a monetary integration or monetary union. At this level of integration, the
conduct of monetary policy, in which the direction of inflation, interest and exchange
rates are critical performance indicators, is vested in a supranational central bank,
while the national central banks perform the functions of banking operations,
supervision, etc. In the case of the European Union, the introduction of the euro and
the establishment of the European Central Bank marked the commencement of the
European Monetary Union. In the ECOWAS sub-region, the planned introduction of
a single currency and, thus, a single monetary zone in 2005 was evidently not
feasible, largely because of the poor foundation of economic parameters on which to
advance to monetary integration.
Sequencing of Integration Process
The various layers or structure of integration discussed above is a deliberate effort to
show generally a sequence which a monetary integration process should take. The
political decision of governments to form a monetary union can only be realized when
the people are mobilized and the right institutions created to drive the integration
process.

Thus, political, social and institutional integration provide adequate

capacity for integration.
Following the provision of adequate capacity, we can then proceed to lay the critical
foundation for success. First and foremost, is to achieve market integration. The EU
spent about three decades to achieve a common market. A common market is the
bedrock which inevitably stimulates and encourages financial and infrastructure
integration.

The combined effects of these accelerate production integration;

because, the size or extent of market determines the overall level of production. If
these which collectively provide a critical foundation for a successful monetary
integration are non-existent, then calling for convergence criteria and introduction of
a single currency are like placing the cart before the horse; and certainly as this
proverb goes, a house that is built on a sandy or shaky foundation does not stand.
The poor countries’ performances with respect to the convergence criteria reveal or
reflect the weak foundation on which ECOWAS or WAMZ integration process stands.
ECOWAS or WAMZ member countries dissipate energy integrating in all fronts
without a clear focus or a direction of integration.
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It is only when a solid foundation has been laid that we can commence the
application of harmonization of policies.

These include the implementation of

convergence criteria policy for economic integration and introduction of a common
currency to commence monetary policy.

VI

Policy Recommendations for the Ecowas Subregion

Arising from the foregoing analysis are policy recommendations to address the
problems undermining the achievement of ECOWAS monetary union.
A major policy thrust emerging from the analysis above is the need for the leadership
of every member country to provide the political will and commitment needed for the
implementation of ECOWAS policies and programmes for integrating the subregion.
Furthermore, the expected merger of the two unions will require the concerted efforts
of countries such as Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana and Benin Republic to provide the
needed leadership and total political commitment for other countries to follow.
An appropriate framework for mobilizing the people who are the agents for achieving
economic reforms and integration is absolutely necessary. It may be difficult to
mobilize hungry people. Therefore, the ECOWAS governments should provide jobs,
affordable housing, improved healthcare services, education and water supply under
various policies and programmes in order to form the basis for effective social
integration to attract the people’s support, confidence and participation.

The

sensitization programme should include seminars/workshops, rallies, posters, bill
boards, banners, radio/television jingles, and radio/television discussions.
The right institutions should not only be created but should be empowered in order
to make them effective in driving the integration efforts. Therefore, WAMA/WAMI,
WACB, WAFSA, WABA should be well-funded and staffed to provide the technical
support for nurturing the ECOWAS integration. The setting up of permanent sectoral
commissions

or

departments

to

facilitate

the

speed

of

policy

proposal,

implementation and supervision, evaluation and reviews is extremely important for
the WAMZ group, rather than addressing sectoral issues on an adhoc expert
committee basis.
To make the sub-region market accessible as the bedrock of integration, ECOWAS
needs to review the trade liberalization policy as was the case with the EU’s Single
Act.

It should effectively eliminate all tariff and non-tariff barriers, enforce the
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protocol of free movement of goods, capital and persons across countries. It should
stipulate appropriate penalties or sanctions for non-compliance through a simple
majority voting.
There is need for the harmonization of financial market (money and capital)
conventions and best practices including banking consolidation and supervision,
efficient payments system, computerization, standard telecommunications facilities
such as the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System that is being implemented by
some ECOWAS countries and should be complemented by internet, e-mail, telex and
fax machines services to facilitate same time cross border transactions and
settlements.
The provision of adequate infrastructure promotes trade and rapid integration.
Therefore, member countries should place priority in the provision of standardized
strategic roads, rail, air and water transportation; general telecommunication
facilities as well as energy and water supplies, all of which are basic requirements for
successful integration. In this connection, a major ECOWAS road being constructed
from Nigeria through the sub-region to Senegal for the free flow of vehicular
movement and the West African Gas Pipeline/West African Energy Power Pool
projects to provide energy are indeed commendable. Similar steps should be taken to
provide water, air and rail transportation.
To facilitate production integration, ECOWAS should promote common agricultural,
industrial, research and development policies as well as regional development
programmes and projects. In these contexts, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
and Common Industrial Policy (CIP) already approved should be seen to be
implemented by all countries to ensure standards for the sub-region.
The effective application of appropriate mix of internal monetary, fiscal,
exchange rate and debt management policies by member countries to promote
economic development and achieve the convergence criteria set for the WAMZ area is
crucial for attaining economic integration of member states.
The existing economic structure and macroeconomic indicators in ECOWAS are still
weak, and should be strengthened to provide a basis for the introduction of a single
currency for the commencement of a monetary union. Indeed, these limitations
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informed the postponement of the introduction of the ECO currency in the WAMZ
area to 2009.
With respect to the sequencing of integration, ECOWAS/WAMZ should place more
emphasis on achieving the requirements of a common market as recommended in
(iv). This is a prerequisite and necessary foundation which determines the success of
other higher levels of integration.

VII

Summary and Conclusion

The paper discussed the historical evolution of the EEC, now known as the EU, which
progressed from a free trade area, customs union and to a common market. At this
stage, the vision of the founding fathers was to transit into a monetary union,
comprising a conglomeration of the national economies of Europe into a monolithic
entity (the EU) which was earlier suggested as the United States of Europe. By the
mid 1980s, the Single Act agreement removed all the barriers militating against the
attainment of a common market, and prepared the stage for advancement into an
economic union. Thus, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which specified the convergence
criteria for all participating countries, was a remarkable advancement into an
economic union. By 1998, when the economies of most of the participating countries
were adjudged to have met all the convergence criteria and certified as an economic
union, the stage was set for the most memorable event of the march towards
attaining a monetary union. Following the design and adoption of a single currency
and the necessary preparations, the EU launched the European Monetary Union on
January 1, 1999 when the single currency, the euro, was introduced.
The introduction of the euro had some significant implications for the entire region,
these included currency, money market, capital market, foreign exchange market and
reserves management as well as implications for the UEMOA Francophone countries.
These countries’ monetary union is anchored on the CFA franc with a fixed parity to
the former French franc, and now the euro. The relevance of these implications in
the context of an ECOWAS monetary union cannot be overemphasized; adequate
preparations should, therefore, be made to provide a basis for ECOWAS effective
integration. The EU’s lessons of experience indicated that the integration processes
leading to the achievement of the EMU, was a great feat that was well planned and
implemented progressively from one level to the other. Political integration was
necessary to provide the leadership will and drive, which was reinforced by the
appropriate social integration aimed at sensitizing and mobilizing the people to
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realize the desired objectives. Institutional integration was the pivot for directing the
course of integration and also for realizing market, financial, infrastructural,
production, economic and monetary integration.
These processes must be given adequate consideration, articulated properly, well
sequenced and focused to achieve the ECOWAS’ objectives if it desires to spend fewer
years to attain its monetary union.
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Appendix
Table 1: EMU Convergence Criteria
Inflation (%)

Long Term Interest Rate (%)

Government Balance
(% GDP)

1996*

1995

1996

1997

1998

1995

1996

1997

1998

1995

1996

1997

1998

EMU Reference Value

2.6

3

2.3

2.8

3.3

9.7

9.1

8.4

7.9

-3.0

-3.0

-3.0

-3.0

Belgium

1.8

1.6

2.5

2.3

2.2

7.5

6.5

6.0

5.9

-4.1

-3.3

-3.0

-3.0

Denmark

1.9

2.1

2.1

2.2

2.5

8.3

7.2

6.3

6.4

-1.6

-1.5

0.7

0.5

Germany

1.2

1.8

1.4

1.6

1.8

6.8

6.2

5.9

5.9

-3.5

-3.9

-3.2

-3.2

Greece

7.9

9.0

8.2

5.0

4.0

17.4

14.8

11.3

10.0

-9.1

-7.6

-5.7

-5.0

Spain

3.6

4.7

3.6

2.3

2.5

11.3

8.7

6.8

6.3

-6.6

-4.4

-3.3

-2.9

France

2.1

1.8

2.0

1.7

1.9

7.5

6.3

5.8

5.9

-4.8

-4.1

-3.2

-3.0

Ireland

na

2.5

1.7

1.7

2.0

8.3

7.3

6.4

5.9

-2.4

-1.5

-1.1

-0.5

Italy

4.0

5.4

3.8

2.0

2.4

12.2

9.4

7.3

6.6

-7.1

-6.8

-3.8

-3.5

Luxembourg

1.2

1.9

1.4

1.8

2.0

7.6

6.5

6.0

5.9

1.5

1.5

0.8

0.5

Netherlands

1.5

2.0

2.1

2.3

2.2

6.9

6.1

5.9

5.9

-4.0

-2.2

-2

-1.7

Austria

1.8

2.2

1.9

1.7

1.9

7.1

6.3

5.9

5.9

-5.9

-3.9

-3.0

-3.0

Portugal

2.9

4.1

3.1

2.7

2.7

11.4

8.6

6.8

6.4

-5.1

-4.0

-3.1

-2.9

Finland

1.5

1.0

0.6

1.2

1.8

8.8

7.0

6.3

6

-5.6

-2.9

-1.7

-0.7

Sweden

0.8

2.5

0.5

1.0

2.0

10.3

8.0

6.9

6.9

-8.1

-3.5

-2.5

-1.0

United Kingdom

na

2.8

3.0

2.7

3.0

8.2

7.8

7.3

7.0

-5.6

-4.4

-2.8

-2.7
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EMS

1995

1996

1997

1998

60

60

60

60

EMS

Criteria Met
1995

1996

1997

1998

Belgium

134

131

128

125

YES

2

1

3

3

Denmark

72

71

67

65

YES

3

4

4

4

Germany

58

60

61

62

YES

3

3

2

2

Greece

112

109

105

102

NO

0

0

0

0

Spain

66

68

68

67

YES

0

1

2

3

France

53

55

57

58

YES

3

3

3

4

Ireland

86

80

76

71

YES

4

4

4

4

Italy

124

123

121

121

NO

0

0

2

2

Luxembourg

6

5

4

4

YES

4

4

4

4

Netherlands

80

78

75

72

YES

2

4

4

4

Austria

69

71

69

69

YES

2

4

4

4

Portugal

72

70

68

67

YES

2

2

3

3

Finland

60

61

61

60

YES

0

1

2

3

Sweden

79

78

77

76

NO

1

2

3

3

United Kingdom
54
56
57
*Harmonized indices of consumer prices. Source: ING Eurovied

57

NO

3

2

4

4
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